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Abstract 
Hedge fund activism has emerged as a major force of corporate governance since the 
2000s.  By the mid-2000s, there were between 150–200 activist hedge funds in action 
each year, advocating for changes in 200–300 publicly listed companies in the U.S.  In 
this paper, we review the evolution and major characteristics of hedge fund activism, as 
well as the short- and long-term impact of such activities on the performance and 
governance of the targeted companies.  Though most of the analyses are based on a 
comprehensive sample of over 2,000 activism events in the U.S. from 1994 to 2011, 
hand-collected by the authors from regulatory filings and news searches, this paper 
covers all major studies on the topic, including those on non-U.S. markets. 
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I. Data on Hedge Fund Activism 
This section reviews the approaches researchers have taken to construct samples 
of hedge fund activism events. Data on activist interventions in the U.S. are generally 
based on Schedule 13D filings submitted to the SEC.  Section 13(d) of the 1934 
Securities Exchange Act requires investors who are beneficial owners of over 5% of any 
class of publicly traded securities of a company, and who have an intention to influence 
corporate control, to disclose their ownership and intent within 10 days of crossing the 5% 
threshold. The Schedule 13D filing provides the filing date and information about the 
identity of the filer, such as the filer’s ownership and its changes, cost of purchase, and 
most importantly, the purpose of the investment (from Item 4 “Purpose of Transaction”). 
It is important to note that the SEC allows beneficial owners who have purchased shares 
in the ordinary course of business and do not intend to influence control to file a Schedule 
13G, which requires less information and allows the filer a longer delay in disclosure.   
Brav et al. (2008) construct a comprehensive sample of activism events in the U.S. 
that includes interventions from both Schedule 13D filings and events with below 5% 
stakes. They begin with a complete list of all Schedule 13D filers over the period 2001–
2006, and then  identify hedge fund managers based on the names and descriptions of the 
filer type listed in Item 2 (“Identity and Background”) combined with Internet/news 
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searches of the filers. Next, they gather all Schedule 13D filings and the amendments 
(Schedule 13D/A) available on the SEC’s EDGAR system. To mitigate the concern that 
the Schedule 13D-based sample is biased toward smaller targets because of the large 
amount of capital required to acquire a stake of 5% or more in a large-cap company, Brav 
et al. (2008) search Form 13Fs filed with the SEC and media outlets for events with 
smaller percentage stakes. Finally, Brav et al. (2008) rely on a combination of 
information from SEC filings and news searches from Factiva for the coding of the key 
aspects of events, such as the announcement date, ownership stake, stated objectives, 
managerial responses, and outcomes.  Lastly, they exclude filings that involve risk 
arbitrage, distress financing, and non-regular corporations such as closed-end funds. Brav 
et al.  (2013) and Bebchuk et al. (2014) apply the same approach, extending the sample of 
activist events to the period 1994–2007.  
Within the U.S., most studies similarly begin with all Schedule 13D filings and 
then verify the identity of the filers to filter out non-hedge funds. To verify the identity of 
the filers, authors have used keyword searches on the Internet and other media databases 
(Gantchev (2013)), fund names from databases to which hedge funds may voluntarily 
report ( Greenwood & Schor (2009); Boyson & Mooradian (2010)), and/or hedge fund 
websites (Clifford (2008)). Most authors use multiple approaches. Additionally, while 
most studies begin with the universe of Schedule 13D filings, many studies then restrict 
the final sample to a specific setting. For example, Klein & Zur (2009) start with all 
Schedule 13D filings, but restrict their sample to transactions that present an explicit 
activist agenda, excluding events that only present a general agenda (e.g., stock 
undervaluation). Similarly, Greenwood & Schor (2009) begin with a sample of all 
Schedule 13D filings and definitive proxy statements filed by non-management, but 
restrict the sample to transactions by investment managers that have filed Form 13F at 
some point in their history in order not to confuse corporate crossholdings with activist 
investment. Given that hedge fund activism is a relatively recent phenomenon, most 
studies use recent data from the 2000s.  
Data on hedge fund activism outside of the U.S. comes, not surprisingly, from a 
range of sources. Becht et al. (2009) collect their sample of activism events in the U.K. 
using proprietary data from one hedge fund, while Mietzner & Schweizer (2014) 
4 
 
construct their sample from the disclosure of the acquisition of at least 5% of shares in 
public firms from the German Federal Financial Supervisory Authority. Other studies 
have compiled samples of activism events through extensive news/media searches 
(Stokman (2007); Uchida & Xu (2008); Hamao et al. (2010)). More recently, Becht et al. 
(2014) gather a large sample of activism events that took place in North America, Asia, 
and Europe for the period 2000–2010, and they find that the Asian sample is concentrated 
mainly in Japan, but that there are a larger number of European countries with significant 
activity such as Germany, France, Italy, Netherlands and Switzerland. 
The sample used for the rest of the review is based on the data collection method 
in Brav et al. (2008) described above, which was extended to the period 1994–2011.  We 
also exclude target firms with non-common share codes (those that differ from 10 and 11) 
as identified from information from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). 
The final sample includes 2,624 activism events.  Panel A (Panel B) in Figure 1 presents 
the yearly number of activism events (hedge funds) over the sample period. Two features 
are evident from Figure 1. First, there is a clear trend in both the number of funds and 
events, which is consistent with the rising success of hedge fund activism and the 
increase in capital committed to these funds. Second, both plots show a pro-cyclical 
pattern. Activism events peak in good times, whereas there is increased exit and a decline 
in engagements in recessions (Burkart & Dasgupta (2014)).  
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II. Characteristics of Hedge Fund Activism Events 
Brav et al. (2008) summarize the stated objectives that the activist funds provide 
when they announce their intent to intervene into the following five major categories: 
“general undervaluation/maximize shareholder value,” “capital structure,” “business 
strategy,” “sale of target company,” and “governance.” The objectives, except the first, 
are not mutually exclusive as one activist event can target multiple issues. The first 
category represents 59.5% of the sample and includes events in which the hedge fund 
believes that the company is undervalued and/or that the fund can help the manager 
maximize shareholder value. The second category (12.7% of the sample) includes 
activism targeting firms’ payout policies and capital structure. The third set of events 
includes activism targeting issues related to business strategy, such as operational 
efficiency, business restructuring, mergers and acquisitions, and growth strategies. This 
group represents 17.8% of all events. The fourth category, comprising 15.2% of activist 
events, involves activism demanding the sale of the target. In this category, hedge funds 
attempt either to force a sale of the target company to a third party, or, in a small minority 
of the cases, to acquire the company themselves. Lastly, the fifth set of events includes 
activism targeting corporate governance. In this category, representing 31% of the sample, 
hedge funds attempt to rescind takeover defenses,  oust the CEO or chairman, challenge 
board independence and fair representation, demand more information disclosure and 
question potential fraud, or challenge the level or the pay-for-performance sensitivity of 
executive compensation. Greenwood & Schor (2009) report a similar representation of 
objectives for their sample of hedge fund activism: They find that agendas related to 
undervaluation, capital structure, asset sales, and corporate governance represent 45.5, 
11.5, 18.1, and 21.9 percent of their full sample, respectively.  
Brav et al. (2008) categorize seven tactics used by hedge funds to accomplish 
their goals. The categorization ranges from the least to most aggressive. The first 
category includes events in which the hedge fund states that it intends to communicate 
with the board/management on a regular basis with the goal of enhancing shareholder 
value. Roughly 43% of the 1994–2011 sample falls into this category, and very few 
filings in this group publicly reveal any specific agenda by the hedge fund. The second 
category includes events in which the hedge fund seeks board representation without a 
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proxy contest or other confrontational event. The third category includes cases where the 
hedge fund makes formal shareholder proposals, or publicly criticizes the management 
and demands change. Next, the fourth category includes events in which the hedge fund 
threatens to wage a proxy fight in order to gain board representation, or to sue the 
management for breach of duty. The fifth category includes events in which the hedge 
fund launches a proxy contest in order to replace the board. The remaining two groups 
include events in which the hedge fund sues the company in order to take control of the 
company (e.g., with a take-over bid). 
Next, we examine the percentage ownership and the value of stakes that activist 
hedge funds acquire in target firms. The size of the activists’ stakes in their target firms, 
both in dollar value (at cost) and as a percentage of outstanding shares of the target, are 
compiled from initial 13D filings, amendments thereof, and news sources. The median 
initial (maximum) percentage stake that a hedge fund takes in the target over the period 
1994–2011 is 6.4 (9.5)%, and the median dollar stake, at cost, is 13.5 (18.6) million in 
2011-constant dollars. Hostile cases—defined as events that fall into the fourth through 
seventh tactic categories above, or those that fall in the third category but involve a stated 
hostile intention (e.g., to oust the CEO)—exhibit larger ownership stakes in target firms 
and greater capital commitments by the hedge funds, especially at the higher percentiles 
of the sample.  
Importantly, it is evident that these activist engagements do not generally involve 
controlling blocks. Even at the 95th percentile of the sample, hedge funds hold 21.8 
percent in the target companies, considerably lower than the majority requirement. These 
numbers are comparable across different studies. Boyson & Mooradian (2010) document 
that the mean initial (maximum) percentage ownership by hedge funds in target 
companies is 8.8 (12.4) percent. Similarly, Greenwood & Schor (2009) report a 9.8 
percent average. It therefore appears that the activist hedge funds do not generally aim to 
take control of their targets. Rather, their goal is to push the target to undertake value-
enhancing decisions as minority shareholders.  As such, they often need support from 
other shareholders, especially on issues that require shareholder voting. These features 
distinguish the activist hedge funds from the corporate raiders in the 1980s, who sought 
to obtain full control to internalize all the benefits from their intervention.  
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Finally, activist hedge funds’ investment horizons have been an issue of 
contention. Critics accuse activist funds of aiming for short-term gains at the expense of 
long-term shareholder value. 3  We measure the duration of hedge fund activists’ 
investment in target companies from the day the market first learns of the activist stake 
through the “exit date” when the hedge fund significantly reduces its investment in the 
target company. We use the last 13D/A filing to determine when the ownership drops 
below the 5% disclosure threshold (i.e., the “exit date”). When such information is not 
available, we use the date when the outcome of sale of the target or the fund’s withdrawal 
from the intervention is announced. Focusing on the sub-sample of the completed events 
where the information to determine the exit date is available, we find that the median 
(mean) duration from the first Schedule 13D filing to divestment is 348 (581) days, 
implying that the distribution of the duration is right-skewed. Furthermore, as also shown 
by Boyson & Mooradian (2010), events that are initiated with hostility have a shorter 
investment horizon than the non-hostile events.  
However, the estimates reported above generally under-estimate the unconditional 
duration of hedge funds’ investment in the target companies because they exclude 
investments censored at the end of the sample period and they assume that dropping 
below 5% level represents divestment.  Using the annual portfolio turnover rates of the 
activist hedge funds (based on their quarterly holdings disclosed in 13F filings), Brav et 
al. (2008) report that the average holding period of a position is close to two years. 
 
III. Characteristics of Target Companies 
We now discuss evidence based on regression results predicting hedge funds’ 
targeting following the specification in Brav et al. (2010). The probit regressions cover 
all Compustat firm-year observations from 1994 to 2011. The dependent variable is a 
dummy variable equal to one if the firm-year observation corresponds to a firm being 
targeted by a hedge fund during the year.  All of the firm characteristics variables are 
                                                 
3
 See “To Battle, Armed with Shares” by Andrew Ross Sorkin, Wall Street Journal, January 4th 2006, 
quoting Martin Lipton, of the law firm Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz: “...it's a terrible thing for corporate 
America,... I think what we're seeing is a replay of the attempt to drive American business to short-term 
results instead of long-term values.” 
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from various components of the WRDS database (including CRSP, Compustat, Thomson, 
IBES, and Risk Metrics), recorded at the year-end before the potential targeting.  
The probability of activism is inversely related to the market value of equity. This 
result is robust and consistent with many other studies including Clifford (2008), 
Greenwood & Schor (2009), Klein & Zur (2009), Boyson & Mooradian (2010), and 
Mietzner & Schweizer (2014). Larger firms may be less appealing targets to activist 
funds (the median activist fund in our sample manages less than $1 billion of assets) 
because of the large amount of capital a hedge fund would need to invest in order to 
amass a meaningful stake, which might in turn introduce an inordinate amount of 
idiosyncratic risk to the portfolio. 
We also find that activist hedge funds behave like “value investors” attempting to 
identify undervalued companies where the potential for improvement is high. q, a proxy 
for firm valuation defined as (book value of debt + market value of equity)/(book value 
of debt + book value of equity), is inversely related to the likelihood of intervention. To 
the extent that activist hedge funds profit from improvement of the companies’ operations 
and strategies, it is also important that hedge funds target companies whose stock prices 
have yet to reflect the potential for improvement. Target firms outside the U.S. have a 
similar characteristic of “value firms.”  
We also find that target firms tend to be less profitable than comparable firms, as 
measured by return on assets (ROA). Consistent with the evidence on profitability, 
lagged annual sales growth is also inversely related to targeting, although this result is not 
statistically robust. Target firms also have higher leverage, significantly lower dividend 
payouts, and less research and development spending than do peer firms. While the 
finding on R&D is statistically weak in our sample, this result is confirmed by Boyson & 
Mooradian (2010), who report that target firms have lower R&D expenditures than 
matched firms at the median.  
Finally, as in Brav et al. (2010), we find that targets have significantly higher 
institutional ownership than their peers but that analyst coverage is inversely related to 
intervention in a multivariate regression framework.  Given that analyst coverage is 
positively related to the propensity of activism in a univariate regression, it is likely that 
the collinearity with institutional ownership and the illiquidity measure leads the sign on 
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analyst coverage to flip (as both institutional ownership and analyst coverage proxy for 
shareholder sophistication). This is an important factor for activist hedge funds because 
they often rely on the understanding and support from fellow shareholders in order to 
implement the changes, given their minority stakes in the target firms. Using a direct 
trading liquidity measure, the Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure, we find that target 
companies exhibit higher trading liquidity than comparable firms. High liquidity makes it 
easier for the activists to accumulate a stake within a short period of time without 
incurring adverse market impact (Collin-Dufresne & Fos (2014)).  
In summary, the characteristics of target firms suggest that hedge funds tend to 
identify problems that are generalizable to all firms, such as changes in governance and 
payout policies, rather than issues that are specific to individual target firms. These 
targeting patterns seem sensible given that hedge funds are, in general, not experts in the 
specific business of the firms they invest in. Focusing on issues that are generalizable to 
other potential target firms helps to lower the marginal cost of launching activism on a 
new company (Black (1990)). Another reason to avoid targeting an idiosyncratic firm 
issue is offered by Kahn & Winton (1998). Their theory predicts that investors are more 
likely to intervene in well-understood firms or industries so that the market can 
appreciate the effects of intervention.  
 
IV. Does Hedge Fund Activism Create Value for Shareholders? 
We now ask whether hedge fund activism generates value for shareholders. We 
address this question by examining both short-run stock returns around the announcement 
of activism as well as subsequent long-run returns.  
Figure 2 plots the average buy-and-hold return, in excess of the buy-and-hold 
return on the CRSP value weight index, from 20 days prior to the event date to 20 days 
afterwards for all events from 1994 to 2011. The event date is defined as the Schedule 
13D filing date if available, or the first announcement of targeting if the hedge fund 
ownership stake is lower than 5 percent.  The average abnormal return for the entire event 
period is about 5%.  Importantly, half of this abnormal return takes place in the few days 
leading up to filing.  
 
average buy-and-hold 
abnormal return 
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The magnitude of the announcement-window abnormal returns is comparable 
with those in other studies on U.S. activism events. Klein & Zur (2009) report a similar 
7.2 percent for the [-30, +30] window. Clifford (2008), Greenwood & Schor (2009), and 
Boyson & Mooradian (2010) document significantly positive average abnormal 
announcement-day returns ranging from 3.4 to 8.1 percent for various event windows.  
The stock market’s reaction to the disclosure of activist funds’ engagement in a 
target outside the U.S. is broadly consistent with the U.S. experience. Becht, Franks, 
Mayer, and Rossi (2009) report that the mean abnormal return over the [-5, +5] window 
around the announcement of activism outcomes is 3.94 percent in the U.K. Similarly, 
Becht et al. (2010) and Stokman (2008) document that average cumulative abnormal 
returns around the [-25, +25] announcement-day window ranges from about 6–12 percent 
for activism events in Europe. For Japan, Uchida & Xu (2008) document an average 
excess return of 5.6 percent for the [-2, +2] window around the announcement of activist 
events. Combined evidence suggests that investors perceive hedge fund activism as 
value-enhancing for shareholders. 
Figure 2 also shows the average abnormal trading volume over the event window 
(dashed line). The abnormal volume is defined as the share turnover rate over the 
“normal” turnover rate measured over the [-100, -40] window preceding the event date. 
The spike in abnormal trading volume does not occur on the event day but rather during 
the ten-day period before the announcement. The ten day lead seems to be consistent with 
the fact that investors are required to file Schedule 13D no later than ten days after the 
transaction causing them to exceed the 5% threshold. Therefore, it is possible that the 
filing fund may be engaging in additional buying prior to the announcement of activism. 
Alternatively, the abnormal volume in the days preceding the filing date may be 
consistent with “wolf pack” investing, in which several hedge funds, who do not formally 
coordinate, buy into the target firm or with “tipping,” where the lead hedge fund reveals 
its intention to a small number of investors before the public filing. 
Further evidence on the time-series properties of the short-run average abnormal 
return is given in Figure 3. The yearly average abnormal return during the [-20, +20] 
window exhibits an interesting counter-cyclical pattern. The average abnormal event-day 
return is almost 14% on average in 2001 and 8% in 2009, but is less than 2 percent in 
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2007–2008. This decline may be driven by competition just like any other investment 
strategy: hedge funds’ activist “arbitrage” strategy intensified over the years, leading to 
the entry of more players into the field, which in turn reduced the equilibrium returns to 
activism. 
 
 
Various studies explore the cross-sectional heterogeneity in market perceptions 
regarding the expected value generated by activism. Greenwood and Schor (2009) report 
that abnormal returns are the highest for events related to asset sales and block mergers of 
the target firm.  Brav et al. (2010) find that activism announcements in which the 
activist’s intent is to sell the target generates the highest abnormal return, with an average 
of 8.54 percent. Becht et al. (2010) document a similar difference in average abnormal 
returns between acquired and non-acquired targets (8.1 vs. 5.2 percent) for activism 
events in Europe. On the other hand, the initial returns related to governance-related 
hedge fund activism are mixed. While Boyson & Mooradian (2010) report that 
governance-related hedge fund activism is associated with the most favorable stock 
market reaction, Becht et al. (2010) find that the abnormal returns generated by 
governance issues are not statistically distinguishable from zero.   
It is possible that the positive abnormal returns document in these short event 
windows are temporary and reflect a trading friction rather than information about 
prospective value changes. If so, we should observe negative abnormal returns shortly 
after the event. This is not to be the case in our data—extending Figure 2 shows that 
abnormal returns are not negative, but are instead roughly zero. These results are 
comparable to those in Clifford (2008), who also runs calendar-time portfolio regressions 
for the target firms in his sample. For windows of [0, +12], [0, +24], and [0, +36] (in 
months), he finds that the average three- and four-factor alphas range from 1.0 to 1.9 
percent per month and that they are statistically significant. More formal return analyses 
based on the five years following intervention are discussed in the next section and 
corroborate the conclusion that abnormal prices do not decline post-event. This evidence 
refutes a market over-reaction hypothesis and supports the hypothesis that hedge fund 
activism creates value for shareholders. Yet, evidence on increased shareholder wealth 
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may not be sufficient to demonstrate that hedge fund activism creates real, long-term 
value for the target firm and its stakeholders. This is the topic discussed in the next 
section. 
 
V. The Real and Long-term Effects of Hedge Fund Activism 
Though there has been little controversy over the positive short-term stock market 
reaction, there has been significant recent debate over whether the effects of shareholder 
activism are “real” — that is, whether activists have a long-term effect on firm 
“fundamentals” that lasts beyond the short-term market reaction or whether activist 
interventions are mere “financial engineering.” Most critics of hedge fund activism have 
argued that activists narrowly focus on short-term financial performance, and that such 
“short-termism,” as well as a focus on financial metrics, is detrimental to the long-term 
value of the target companies. This concern over short-termism has been repeated by 
academics (Bratton & Wachter, (2010), Fox & Lorsch (2012), George & Lorsch (2014)), 
members of the government (Donaldson (2006), Strine (2010; 2014)), and practitioners 
(Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz (2013) Memorandum4).  
These opponents of hedge fund activism argue that although operating 
performance and abnormal stock returns in the year following intervention are positive, 
the initial metrics reflect unsustainable changes that have been achieved through financial 
engineering such as shareholder distributions or increased leverage, and will not translate 
into long-term improvement once a proper benchmark is set. They frequently argue that 
gains to activists reflect wealth-transfers from other firm stakeholders rather than 
evidence of long-term value creation. For example, they argue that activists benefit at the 
expense of long-term shareholders through “pump and dump” schemes, in which the 
activist sells the shares after earning a short-term profit.  The critics can also point to 
studies such as Klein & Zur (2011), which showed that bondholders experience negative 
                                                 
4
 Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz Memorandum, Bite the Apple; Poison the Apple; Paralyze the Company; 
Wreck the Economy, The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation.  
Available at: 
http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2013/02/26/bite-the-apple-poison-the-apple-paralyze-the-company-
wreck-the-economy/.  
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abnormal returns following activist interventions, to argue that the purported gains from 
activism reflect wealth transfers rather than overall net gains.  
In this section, we present comprehensive empirical evidence to directly address 
the concerns regarding the “real” and “long-term” effects of hedge fund activism.   
 
A. The Real Effects of Hedge Fund Activism 
The most “real” part of the economy is probably the production process.  About 
one-third of the companies targeted by hedge fund activists are manufacturing firms 
whose activities at the plant level are covered by the U.S. Census Bureau’s Annual 
Surveys of Manufacturers (ASM) and the Census of Manufacturers (CMF)5 (henceforth, 
the “Census data”) (this proportion is comparable to the representation of manufacturing 
firms in the universe of publicly listed companies).  The Census data provide crucial 
elements of the production process, such as the plant assets, number of employees, annual 
payroll, capital and materials used, and ownership status. Matching the Census data with 
a sample of hedge fund activism events from 1994 to 2007, Brav et al. (2013) find that 
plant productivity following activist intervention increases relative to the time of 
intervention, suggesting that activists make real changes to the target firms’ fundamental 
values.  Because hedge fund activists may increase firm productivity by either improving 
the efficiency of assets in place or by reallocating capital, the authors further examine 
both channels and find that activists increase firm productivity through both channels. 
The results in Brav et al. (2013) have several important implications. First, 
activists target firms with plants that are at equal or greater levels of productivity than a 
set of control plants. This result is consistent with the finding in Brav et al. (2008) that 
hedge funds generally target mature firms that have relatively strong business 
fundamentals, but that are facing difficulty due to mismanagement or other governance 
problems. Second, plant productivity increases following intervention. The increase is 
due both to an increase in the efficiency of assets in place and to reallocation of 
underperforming assets. Third, although plant productivity increases, the employees 
experience a reduction in work hours and stagnation in wages.  
                                                 
5
 The Longitudinal Business Database (LBD), another establishment-level dataset maintained by the 
Census Bureau, covers all economic sectors in the U.S. providing relatively limited information on the 
operation of establishments. See Brav et al. (2013) for more information on the LBD. 
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A1. Productivity before and after activism 
When Brav et al. (2013) examine the productivity of assets in place they find that 
productivity declines in the years prior to intervention, but then rebounds steadily 
afterwards. Plant productivity, measured as total factor productivity (“TFP”), is defined 
as the difference between the actual and predicted output given the inputs, and is 
calculated as the residual from a log-linear Cobb-Douglas production function run at the 
industry-year level (e.g., Lichtenberg & Siegel (1990); Lichtenberg (1992); Schoar 
(2002); Bertrand & Mullainathan (2003); and Giroud (2011)). The TFP measure can thus 
be interpreted as the relative productivity rank for each plant within its specific industry 
in that year. Regressing TFP on seven key independent variables corresponding to the 
three years before the event, the year of the event, and the three years following the 
activism event, the authors show that firm productivity in the years surrounding 
intervention appears to follow a V-shaped pattern in which the year of intervention is the 
base year in the “V.” Importantly, the increase in firm productivity in the third year 
following intervention is statistically significant and economically meaningful. On 
average, TFP at targeted plants increases by 7.7–10.8% of the standard deviation from the 
year of intervention to three years afterwards.  
The increase in plant productivity is particularly prevalent in industries with low 
concentration (Brav et al. (2011)). Prior literature on industry concentration and corporate 
governance has suggested these two forces may work as substitutes (Bauer et al. (2010); 
Giroud & Mueller (2010; 2011)). However, the effect of market concentration is unclear 
in this setting because hedge fund activism is distinct from the prior forms of governance 
studied. Unlike takeovers, activism is not control-driven. Additionally, unlike internal 
forms of governance, activism is market-based. The authors thus address the question 
empirically and show that there is a greater increase in TFP in industries with low 
concentration, suggesting that market competition and outside shareholder monitoring are 
potential complements. The result is economically meaningful: the magnitude of a 
change in productivity from year t to year t+3 is 2.8 times larger in the least concentrated 
industries compared to the most concentrated ones.  
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A2. Productivity associated with capital reallocation 
Given the evidence that productivity increases following the intervention, an 
equally important question is whether such improvements are accomplished through 
improvements in the efficiency of assets in place, capital reallocation, or both.  Brav et al. 
(2008) and Greenwood & Schor (2009) show that initial stock returns are greatest for 
those activism events in which the stated goal is to push for the sale of the target.  
However, these early studies left three unanswered questions.  First, data at the firm level 
provides limited inference on the separation between assets in place and redeployment.  
Second, operating performance based on accounting data, such as ROA, cannot capture 
real changes at the production-unit level.  Third, about 25.5% of the firms targeted by 
hedge funds activists drop out of Compustat within two years (this is almost double the 
average attrition rate for firms in Compustat). Hence, firm-level analysis may suffer from 
an attrition bias.  The plant level analysis that can be conducted using the Census data has 
provided significant progress on these issues. 
Plant-level asset redeployment reveals key aspects of activists’ impact that are 
hard to qualify and quantify at the firm level.  Brav et al. (2013) show that 
underperforming plants are more likely to be sold following hedge fund intervention 
compared with plants of similar attributes. While roughly 23% of the plants of targeted 
companies were sold during the three years following intervention, the same sale rate for 
plants at non-targeted companies was 13%. Notably, the high rate of plant sales is even 
more pronounced when the plant belongs to an industry with low concentration, 
suggesting the role of asset redeployability (Williamson (1988)) and the number of 
potential buyers in facilitating physical capital reallocation. 
The divestiture of negative NPV assets, on its own, could enhance value for the 
shareholders, but it is not clear whether it increases overall efficiency across the economy.  
If the poorly performing plant experiences an increase in productivity under new 
ownership, this strengthens the argument that asset redeployment associated with hedge 
fund activism creates value. Further analysis shows that plants sold after intervention 
exhibit the familiar V-shaped pattern in which productivity decreases during the two 
years before the sale, but then increases after the sale. Moreover, the increase in 
productivity for plant sales following hedge fund intervention is roughly six times greater 
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than the increase in productivity for plant sales that were not associated with hedge fund 
intervention.  
 
A3. The effects of hedge fund activism on other stakeholders  
Some of those who oppose hedge fund activism express the concern that the 
shareholder gain could be a result of wealth transfer from other stakeholders rather than 
value creation.  The literature so far has analyzed the effects on the other two most 
important groups of stakeholders:  creditors and employees. 
 
(i) Creditors 
The effect of hedge fund intervention on creditors based on the existent studies is 
mixed with a close-to-neutral average impact.  Moreover, the outcome appears to be 
heterogeneous largely depending on the objectives of activists. Using a sample of public 
bonds from 1994–2006, Klein & Zur (2011) find that there are, on average, abnormal 
bond returns of -3.9% surrounding the initial Form 13D filing, and that the initial 
negative returns are followed by an additional -4.5% decrease over the following year.  
Several other analyses have investigated the cross-sectional differences noted in 
Klein & Zur (2011) using both public and private debt, and have reached varying 
conclusions regarding the net effect on all creditors. For example, Aslan & Maraachlian 
(2009), using a sample of public bonds from 1996–2008, find that bondholders 
experience positive abnormal returns of roughly 2% upon the initial Schedule 13D filing, 
but negative abnormal returns of 3–5% in the first year following intervention.  While 
bondholders with weak covenant protections and those involved in capital structure 
driven events experienced losses, bondholders enjoyed positive returns from activism 
relating to monitoring (e.g., corporate governance).  
Using data on bank loans, Sunder et al. (2013) and Li & Xu (2010) both find that 
spreads increase following hedge fund interventions in which the activist intends to make 
capital structure changes to the target firm (e.g., increased shareholder payouts). However, 
both analyses also find that hedge fund activism may decrease the cost of debt when the 
activist serves a monitoring function. Both papers report that there are changes in contract 
terms such as the number and type of covenants following intervention. Overall, the 
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results show that there are changes in the target’s credit risk, but that the changes are not 
necessarily either positive or negative. Based on a sample of firms in Chapter 11, Jiang et 
al. (2012) find that hedge fund intervention balances the power of senior creditors relative 
to management, and tends to be associated with better outcomes for junior creditors, in 
the form of higher probability of emergence and better recovery. 
 
(ii) Employees 
As expected, activists are not kind to senior managers such as CEOs. Brav et al. 
(2008) and Fos (2014) show that CEO turnover doubles and compensation is moderated 
and more sensitive to performance after activist intervention. While most observers tend 
to view these changes as signs of better governance, a related concern might arise as to 
whether hedge fund activism might also negatively impact employees below the 
executive rank.   
Brav et al. (2013) analyze the changes in wages and work hours for factory 
workers and staff using the plant-level data. They show that the number of workers and 
the hours per worker decrease following intervention, but that output per hour (a measure 
of labor productivity) increases. The change in wages is not itself statistically significant, 
but the magnitude of the decrease in the number of total labor hours is economically 
meaningful: there is a 10% decrease in total labor hours from the year of intervention to 
three years later. The intervention reduces a wage level that is significantly above peers 
to a level that is at par with the industry peers. The increase in productivity per hour is 
also meaningful as there is a 7.3% increase in labor productivity in the three years 
following intervention. This result is consistent with the argument made by Shleifer and 
Vishny (1986) and Pagano & Volpin (2005) that tightened monitoring on the target’s 
management is associated with improved labor efficiency and more scrutiny over 
generous wages. Moreover, the increase in the sensitivity of executive compensation to 
performance could give mangers stronger incentives to monitor employees and improve 
their efficiency. Relatedly, Popadak (2014) shows that hedge fund activism reduces the 
“culture” orientation of the firm, where culture includes customer-focus, employee 
integrity, and collaboration.   
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A4. Externalities 
More recently, several papers examine how the “threat” of activism has a 
spillover effect that disciplines managers at non-target companies. Fos (2014) studies 
proxy contests and demonstrates that the mere threat, as measured by the probability of 
being targeted, accomplishes similar outcomes to actual proxy contests because firms 
under the “threat” take pre-emptive actions such as increased payouts and leverage, 
reduction in investment, and heightened CEO turnover and scrutiny over CEO pay.   
Gantchev et al. (2014) conduct a similar analysis in a more general setting of 
hedge fund activism.  The authors note that it is difficult for managers to protect 
themselves from activists using traditional tools such as poison pills, and managers 
instead try to defend their companies from activists by pre-emptively addressing their 
perceived vulnerabilities. As the threat of activism increases, companies sharing the same 
fundamentals as previously targeted companies respond by improving asset utilization, 
reducing capital expenditures, and increasing both shareholder payouts and leverage. Zhu 
(2013) finds a similar effect, with additional evidence on operating performance 
improvement.  
In sum, the threat of activism produces positive externalities at non-target firms. 
This is consistent with anecdotal evidence from practitioners that managers attempt to 
self-correct when they are concerned that they will become a target.  
 
A5. Inferences about causality 
Although the combined results from the literature are consistent with activists 
improving performance, these results do not prove a causal relationship.  In fact, the 
observed statistical relations are most plausibly a combination of the effects of stock 
picking and effort exertion by the activists.  Hedge funds are sophisticated investors who 
could potentially profit from picking companies with improving prospects even if they 
remain passive stakeholders, and at the same time hedge funds are likely to choose those 
battles in which they can more effectively influence the outcome in their favor.  
 For this reason, a standard average treatment effect, i.e., the improvement a hedge 
activist could bring about if it were randomly assigned to a company, is likely to be 
limited; moreover, the identification of such an effect is also of limited value for policy 
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implications.  A more interesting question would be as follows:  conditional on hedge 
funds’ selection of targets, would the same outcome prevail if it weren’t for hedge funds’ 
effort (that is, if the funds remain merely as passive investors)?   
The cumulative research to date suggests there is a positive effect of hedge fund 
activism beyond stock picking. Certain changes (notably an almost doubling of CEO 
turnover) are necessarily outcomes of confrontation, which are unlikely to have occurred 
but for the persistence of the activists.  Moreover, undiversified long-term positions 
together with costly engagements, including proxy contests or public campaigns 
(Gantchev (2013)), cannot be justified by pure stock picking.  In addition, openly hostile 
activism events generate higher announcement returns than non-confrontational events. 
And revelation of activist stakes, disclosed on a Schedule 13D, generates higher returns 
than the revelation of large passive stakes, disclosed with a longer delay on Schedule 13G 
(see Klein & Zur (2009), Clifford (2008)).  Finally, Becht et al.’s (2014) multi-country 
evidence that abnormal returns during the entire activist engagement period are 
significantly higher for engagements with specific objectives compared to those without 
cannot be reconciled with stock picking alone. 
Brav et al. (2013) conducted additional tests to directly analyze three specific 
alternate hypotheses. First, they address the possibility that management would have 
instituted the aforementioned changes absent hedge fund intervention. The authors refute 
this hypothesis by analyzing only a subsample of confrontational events in which 
management displayed public resistance to the activist’s agenda, and discovering the 
same pattern for TFP following activist events. Second, they address the possibility that 
activists are sophisticated stock pickers who select firms that are best positioned to 
benefit from an industry shock. For this analysis, they use a subsample of firms that have 
plants in both the primary industry to which the firm belongs and in non-primary 
industries, and they find that improvements in plants in non-primary industries are just as 
strong as improvements in the primary industry. Finally, they address the possibility that 
activists are able to select stocks that are poised for improvement, and that their results 
are driven by activists’ stock picking ability rather than intervention. For this analysis, 
they use a subsample of firms that switched from a passive stance to an active stance and 
thus switched from the 13G filing required for passive investors to the 13D filing 
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required for activist investors (or required when a formerly passive investors decides that 
it may now become an active investor). The results indicate that the performance of 
plants increases after a passive investor becomes active.  
The literature examining the spillover effects of activism, reviewed earlier, also 
needs to address the challenge that the threat of an activist intervention may be correlated 
with unobserved industry or firm characteristics that are also correlated with outcomes.  
Fos (2014) uses the 1992 proxy reform as an exogenous shock to the cost of launching 
proxy contests, and then analyzes the differential effect of stock liquidity. Liquid firms 
have been shown to have a higher likelihood of being targeted than non-liquid firms 
because stock market liquidity facilitates the rapid position accumulation by activists 
(Norli et al. (2014)). Gantchev et al. (2014) use contemporaneous institutional trading in 
stocks outside of the potential target’s industry as an instrument for the likelihood of an 
activist threat. The intuition behind this instrument is that institutional trading is unrelated 
to firm fundamentals, but can cause a temporary market misevaluation due to fund flows 
that function as a random shock causing some marginal firms to become attractive target 
candidates. Aslan and Kumar (2014) uncover a negative impact of hedge fund targeting 
on industry peers especially when product markets are more competitive, using tariffs as 
instruments. 
 
B. The Long-term effects of hedge fund activism 
While the previous section demonstrates that hedge fund intervention brought 
about changes beyond financial engineering or nominal jawboning, this section shows 
that the real changes last beyond the intervention years.  The review is mostly based on 
the study by Bebchuk et al. (2014).  Due to the fact that hedge fund activism is a 
relatively new phenomenon that became common place only in the 2000s (see Figure 1), 
data availability limits the duration of the event window— with five years chosen as the 
event window for the long term ex post analyses. 
 
B1. Operating performance and stock returns  
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Bebchuk et al. (2014) present robust evidence that the positive effects on 
operating performance last at least five years post intervention, and that the short-term 
stock price jump does not reverse in the longer term.  
Bebchuk et al. (2014) show that activism target firms underperform their peers at 
the time of intervention, but that performance increases steadily in the following five 
years. This finding is based on both simple comparisons with industry peers and a series 
of regressions using ROA and Tobin’s Q to reflect operating performance and 
independent dummy variables reflecting each of the three years prior to intervention, the 
year of intervention, and each of the five years following intervention. Using simple 
industry-adjusted comparisons, the authors show that ROA (Tobin’s Q) in the year of 
intervention is −0.025 (−0.467), but that it increases steadily to −0.006 (−0.097) five 
years later where the change is significant. The results in their regressions reveal a similar 
and stronger pattern. ROA and Tobin’s Q are negative in the year of intervention for all 
four specifications, but are higher than the base year in each year following intervention 
in all specifications. This analysis directly contradicts criticism that activists are so 
myopically focused on short-term results that they destroy long-term value. Moreover, 
this result is consistent with the finding of Brav et al. (2013) that plant-level productivity 
keeps improving significantly for three years after the year of intervention. 
Bebchuk et al. (2014) also examine long-term abnormal stock returns for target 
firms. Opponents of hedge fund activism argue that the initial spike in stock returns 
discussed in Section IV is a result of temporary over-reaction that is later reversed 
(Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen, & Katz (2013)). Bebchuk et al. (2014) test whether this 
reversal occurs using three alternate calculations of abnormal returns. First, the authors 
test whether target companies experience negative abnormal returns in the five years 
following intervention by computing firm-level returns based on the CAPM and the 
Fama-French four factor model (Fama & French (1993), Carhart (1997)) using individual 
firm-level regressions. Second, they create a matched set of firms based on size and 
book-to-market and test whether target firms experienced lower average abnormal buy 
and hold returns than the matched set. Finally, they test whether a calendar-time portfolio 
that purchased a position in each target company following the 13D announcement 
window experienced abnormal returns.  
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In all instances, the authors find no evidence that target companies underperform 
given their risk characteristics. Beginning with the firm-level regressions, the alphas are 
negative and economically meaningful for the three years prior to intervention, but 
positive and economically meaningful for the three- and five-year periods following the 
intervention. The mean monthly alpha for a three-year holding period based on the 
CAPM (Fama-French model) is 0.50 (0.32), and the mean alpha for a five-year holding 
period based on the CAPM (Fama-French model) is 0.65 (0.40), excluding the 
announcement window returns. Using the buy and hold returns, the results indicate that 
the abnormal returns for both the three- and five-year periods following intervention are 
positive, but not statistically different from zero. Finally, the alphas for the three and five 
year periods following intervention are positive and economically meaningful in three of 
the four specifications, and negative but economically insignificant in the final estimate.  
Overall, the results do not provide any evidence of long-term underperformance, and 
there is no evidence to suggest that the initial spike in stock price reverses. 
 
A. The most likely “short-termist” schemes  
Bebchuk et al. (2014) examine the three most likely “short-termist” schemes in 
isolation so as to better detect any evidence of post-intervention underperformance.  The 
schemes are the following:  the “pump and dump” scheme, the “asset stripping” criticism, 
and “adversarial” interventions. 
According to the “pump and dump” argument, hedge funds enjoy sizable 
abnormal returns while holding the stock, but then sell the stock after subjecting the 
company through various acts of financial engineering such as leveraged recapitalizations. 
This scheme allows the activist to benefit at the expense of other shareholders, who are 
left with tarnished assets and negative abnormal returns. To test whether firm returns do 
in fact decrease after the activist sells her shares, the authors focus on the stock returns in 
the three years following the filing of an amendment to the original Schedule 13D 
indicating that the activist’s holdings have fallen below the five percent threshold. They 
calculate abnormal returns using individual firm regressions, a comparison of buy and 
hold returns, and long-term portfolio analysis. In all instances, they find no evidence 
suggesting that the target companies underperform following the activists’ departure—
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abnormal returns are either significantly positive or, at worst, not significantly different 
from zero.  
Critics of hedge fund activism frequently note that some activists reduce firm 
resources by stripping the firm of assets via cash payouts and asset sales, and they point 
to this tactic as particularly detrimental because they claim the target firm is saddled with 
increased risk and decreased flexibility following the intervention (Wachtell, Lipton, 
Rosen, & Katz (2013)). Bebchuk et al. (2014) constructed a subset of interventions in 
which there were substantial reductions in capital investments, increases in leverage, or 
increases in payouts to shareholders. The analysis of long-term performance for only this 
subset, about 19% of the sample, shows a similar pattern with the full sample—operating 
performance is greater in each of the five years following the intervention than the year 
of intervention, and the difference between performance in the base year and in years 
three through five is generally statistically significant. These results suggest that activists’ 
actions reduce agency conflicts by moving the company closer to an optimal level of cash 
holdings and investment.  
Adversarial interventions are also frequently cited as detrimental to the targets by 
opponents of activism who argue that managers are distracted by the activist and unable 
to run the company. Bebchuk et al. (2014) consider the intervention to be adversarial 
when any 13D filing indicates that a proxy contest, lawsuit, or confrontational public 
campaign might be necessary to fulfill the activists’ intentions. They find that roughly 22% 
of interventions can be classified as adversarial. As in the previous subset analysis, 
operating performance for each of the five years following the intervention is higher than 
in the year of intervention, and the increase from the base year to years three through five 
is generally significant. Overall, contrary to arguments advanced by critics of activism, 
the authors show that there is no evidence of negative long-term performance following 
adversarial interventions. 
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Figure 1: Number of Funds and Activism Events by Year: 1994–2011 
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Figure 2: Short Run Average Abnormal Return 
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Figure 3: Short-run Market Reaction by Year 
 
 
 
 
